PART II: Case Examples from Central and Eastern Europe

Toxic Waste Importation in Burgas

Bulgaria

Alexander Kodjabashev

Background

In August 1991, the Bulgarian International Services and Investments firm (BISI) Ð registered in Australia Ð proposed that the Bulgarian government import and treat 10 million tons of solid household waste per year. The suggestion contained another optional project for ten years. The financial loan for the whole project came from an American consortium, therefore mainly international companies were involved in the project.

Instead of adopting the project as planned, the head of the harbor of Burgas - as a local authority - allowed the BISI company to use the harbor's facilities and services to dispose, convert and discharge the household and industrial waste. The Ministry of Environment, however, in September 1991, did not give the necessary permission for this change, but formulated eight questions concerning the project that had yet to be clarified by the investors.

Problems/Effects

The problems affected the citizens of Burgas where the toxic waste would have been discharged and where the "conversion plant" was to be built. Four specific problems were raised:

The authorities did not cooperate with each other, communication was poor, as was information supplied to the public. The head of Burgas' harbor allowed the firm to discharge, convert and dispose the industrial waste. The affected citizens were misinformed by the investor; the company declared that it would treat only household waste. Meanwhile, the firm tried to get permission to discharge industrial waste. The initial documentation submitted by BISI included information that toxic waste would be imported from the former Soviet Union.

The origin of the waste created another set of problems. Because the bulk of the waste came from the former Soviet Union - where the control of toxic waste is very weak - authorities were unable to determine the composition of the waste.

In October 1991, further complicating the situation, the Minister of Environment gave permission for the construction of a plant for "waste conversion" with three conditions. This was already a step-down in the Ministry's position compared to the previous stand. In the spring of 1992, BISI started the preparatory activities for the project without sufficiently answering the questions formulated in the Ministry's letter of October 1991 and request from the previous year. So, besides the illegal behavior of the firm, the uncertain and inconsistent behavior of the Ministry was a problem.

Strategies Employed

Some officials in the Bulgarian Ministry of the Environment were interested in preventing the project from being continued and informed Ecoglasnost of the intention to import toxic wastes. Ecoglasnost, in turn, warned the public about the project. Ecoglasnost, a well-known nongovernmental organization with many local chapters and representatives in the local council, organized protests against this project. These protests are considered one of the largest public protest campaigns in Bulgarian history.

Representatives of Ecoglasnost began to organize a media campaign against the project and arranged a press conference, inviting BISI to answer questions from the public. In the meeting it became clear that the firm had not prepared an environmental or economic analysis. The media (television, radio, newspapers) also played an important role, both in providing the public with information and helping Ecoglasnost organize protests. Even the press in France carried the events.

Ecoglasnost successfully acquired information about the Australian firm/importer and its background from the Australian public register. They informed the public in Burgas about the firm and their aims. The public started to organize civil protest actions.

Ecoglasnost and the Ministry of Environment held several meetings involving public participation. In addition, Ecoglasnost used its position as the largest national environmental organization in Bulgaria to lobby members of parliament, a move crucial to the success of the protests.

STAKEHOLDERS
Government:
National:
  • Bulgarian Ministry of Environment
  • Members of Parliament

Local:
  • Head of the Harbor of Burgas (Bulgaria)

Private:
Foreign:
  • Bulgarian International Services and Investments (company registered in Australia)

Public:
  • Local community of Burgas

NGOs:
  • Ecoglasnost

Media:
  • Bulgarian television, radio and newspapers
  • French press

Outcome

Public participation yielded positive results and some negative environmental consequences were avoided.

As a result of the public protest and Ecoglasnost's actions, the authorities did not give the final permit for the construction of the plant and the project was stopped. Included in defense of the action was the fact that the firm did not meet the conditions set by the MoE, but the public concern did also play an important role in their decision. The Australian company was forced to withdraw from the project.

Lessons Learned

In this case, international treaties were not referred to because the problem was mainly local, with some international involvement. The potential danger and risks caused by import of toxic waste by foreign or domestic companies is a typical problem that many CEE countries face due to the lack of sufficient national legislation controlling such activities or because of lack of enforcement.
  1. NGOs and the public used various non-formal instruments (public protests, meetings, media campaign, press conference, etc.) to put pressure on the authorities and helped to enforce existing national legislation. The first step in addressing environmental problems involving international or transboundary elements is to use the possibilities given by national legislation.
  2. The public is often misinformed about the true intentions of projects by industry. NGO's can be a successful "watchdog" for the public.
  3. Information should be gathered from wherever possible. In this case, Ecoglasnost acquired some of its information on BISI from Australian public records.
  4. The government should not always be perceived by NGOs as the enemy. In this case, some members of the Ministry of the Environment also opposed the project and shared information with Ecoglasnost. This exchange of information, the cooperation, benefited both the government, the NGOs and the public.
  5. Local, national and international media involvement can facilitate public awareness of both the problem and plans to protest against a particular project.
  6. Support from within the government enhances the legitimacy of lobbying efforts with parliament and other political authorities.


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